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Abstract
The concept of ‘super-indeterminism’ captures the notion that the free choice assumption of
orthodox quantum mechanics necessitates only the following requirement: an agent’s free-choice
performance in the selection of measurement settings must not represent an exception to the rule of
irreducible quantum indeterminism in the physical universe (i.e, “universal indeterminism”). Any
additional metaphysical speculation, such as to whether quantum indeterminism, i.e., intrinsic
randomness, implicates the reality of experimenter “freedom”, “free will”, or “free choice”, is
redundant in relation to the predictive success of orthodox quantum mechanics. Accordingly,
super-indeterminism views as redundant also, from a technical standpoint, whether an affirmative
or a negative answer is claimed in reference to universal indeterminism as a necessary precondition
for experimenter freedom. Super-indeterminism accounts, for example, for the circular reasoning
which is implicit in the free will theorem by Conway and Kochen [1, 2]. The concept of super-
indeterminism is of great assistance in clarifying the often misunderstood meaning of the concept of
“free variables” as used by John Bell [3]. The present work argues that Bell sought an operational,
effective free will theorem, one based upon the notion of “determinism without predetermination”,
i.e., one wherein “free variables” represent universally uncomputable variables. In conclusion, the
standard interpretation of quantum theory does not answer, and does not need to answer in order
to ensure the predictive success of orthodox theory, the question of whether either incompatibilism
or compatibilism is valid in relation to free-will metaphysics and to the free-will phenomenology of
experimenter agents in quantum mechanics.
∗ Corresponding author: walleczek@phenoscience.com
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1. INTRODUCTION
The question concerning the reality of experimenter free will in science in general, and
in quantum mechanics in particular, has a long and controversial history. As is well-known,
the concept of free will, as such, has eluded universal definition, no less in the context of
quantum theory and quantum indeterminism (e.g., Kane [4, 5]). The present analysis will
limit itself to the introduction – into the larger discussion on “quantum free will” – of the
concept of “super-indeterminism”. Its chief purpose is to draw attention to the fact that
neither the metaphysical position of ‘determinism’ nor of ‘indeterminism’ is capable of offer-
ing any decisive answers towards the reality of experimenter free will in quantum mechanics;
both, the compatibilist, and incompatibilist, interpretation of free will finds strong support
in the community of free-will philosophers (Kane [4, 5]). For explanation, compatibilism is
the position that determinism and free will are compatible, whereas incompatibilism states
that they cannot be. Again, the critical question of determinism versus indeterminism in
quantum theory, such as, for example, in the evaluation of the possibility of de Broglie–Bohm
theory (Bohm [6, 7]) need not be conflated with the additional question of whether determ-
inism or indeterminism is consistent with, or even indicative of, the reality of experimenter
freedom. Fig. 1.1 illustrates the metaphysical position of ‘super-indeterminism’.
1.1. Physical definitions of experimenter free will: indeterminism versus determ-
inism
Regarding the free choice assumption, physical definitions in the literature on quantum
foundations typically invoke concepts such as the complete independence from, or complete
lack of correlation with, any past physical events in nature. A recent example of a concise
definition of free choice in the context of orthodox quantum mechanics is the one by Colbeck
and Renner [8]. They suggest that a choice called ”. . . A is free if the only variables it
is correlated with are those it could have caused.” By that definition, it is apparent that
a free choice action A is one that (i) must be “uncaused” itself, and (ii) sets in motion an
entirely new causal chain, literally from “nothing”, or at least starting from an assumption
of “intrinsic randomness” (compare Fig. 1.1). The strict co-dependence of (non-causal)
‘intrinsic randomness’ and (uncaused) ‘experimenter freedom’ in the definition offered by
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Figure 1.1. Super-indeterminism in the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics. Illustrated
is the standard assumption that experimenter free choice depends on the existence of a process
demonstrating intrinsic randomness and vice versa. Again, the reality of universal indeterminism
depends equally – in turn – on experimenter free will being undetermined . For example, the
concept of ‘super-indeterminism’ accounts for the much-cited, yet controversial, interpretation of
experimenter free will in orthodox quantum mechanics by Conway and Kochen [1] who famously
argued that “if indeed we humans have free will, then [so do] elementary particles.”
Colbeck and Renner [8] is matched, for example, by the metaphysical assumptions also
underlying the free will theorem by Conway and Kochen [1, 2]. These latter authors summed
up the metaphysical import of their (free will) theorem by claiming that “if indeed we humans
have free will, then [so do] elementary particles” (see Fig. 1.1). It is significant for the
present work that Colbeck and Renner [8] conclude their own efforts at defining physically
a free-will concept by referring to the authority of John Bell. They refer to Bell’s well-
known, but often misinterpreted, statement concerning the meaning of “free variables” in
the context of quantum-mechanical predictions (Bell [3]): “For me this means that the values
of such variables have implications only in their future light cones.” In particular, Colbeck
and Renner [8] have implicated a correspondence between Bell’s position on experimenter
freedom and their own incompatibilist (e.g., super-indeterministic) position on free choice.
In the following, the incongruence, however, of these separate views will be demonstrated.
The subsequent analysis will demonstrate that John Bell did not anticipate, and in fact
denied, any conflict between experimenter freedom and an entirely deterministic world view
(Bell [3, 9, 10]).
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2. JOHN BELL’S OWN “FREE WILL THEOREM” IN QUANTUM MECHANICS
IS COMPATIBILIST
In contrast to both Conway and Kochen [1] and Colbeck and Renner [8], John Bell did not
adopt an incompatibilist approach to the problem of free will in quantum mechanics, e.g.,
the super-indeterministic approach illustrated in Fig. 1.1. Instead, Bell was a compatibilist
when it came to the free choice assumption and the notion of freedom in general. He argued
consistently in the tradition of compatibilism starting in 1976 (Bell [3, 9, 10]). Although
Bell never presented his position on free will as a theorem in name, he discussed in explicit
terms the conceptual foundations, including key metaphysical assumptions, which led him
to propose a free choice concept on an operational basis, a position which might be called
“effective indeterminism”, or “determinism without predetermination”. Specifically, Bell
proposed that an experimenter agent serves in quantum correlation experiments as a source
of effectively free variables, i.e., of variables that are, according to Bell, “. . . effectively free
for the purposes at hand” (Bell [3]). “For me this means”, Bell explained, “that the values
of such variables have implications only in their future light cones. They are in no sense a
record of, and do not give information about, what has gone before. In particular they have
no implications for the hidden variables v in the overlap of the backward light cones. . . ”
(Bell [3]). Contrary to the free choice concept proposed by Colbeck and Renner [8], Bell’s
own approach to the free choice assumption is not founded upon intrinsic randomness or
fundamental quantum indeterminism, i.e., his approach does not reflect super-indeterminism
(see Fig. 1.1).
2.1. John Bell’s concept of “free variables” contradicts “super-indeterminism”
The fact that Bell was a compatibilist and that he thought of ‘freedom’ as a concept
that was not in opposition to ‘determinism’ is amply evident from his explanation in 1977
(Bell [3]). Then, Bell admitted making an error in his original presentation of 1976 when
he had wrongly proposed that ‘free’ variables are “. . . not determined in the overlap of the
backward light cones” (Bell [9]). “Here I must concede at once”, Bell [3] admitted “that the
hypothesis becomes quite inadequate when weakened in this way. The theorem no longer
follows. I was mistaken.” Following this admission, Bell affirmed that ‘free variables’ are
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variables that are neither ‘not determined’ nor ‘uncaused’ therefore, contradicting the or-
thodox concept of super-indeterminism described in Fig. 1.1. Instead, Bell’s free variables
are defined operationally, as was mentioned already, as those that are “. . . effectively free
for the purposes at hand” (Bell [3]). Bell’s crucial insight was this: a concept of effective
experimenter free will must account for the fact that choices (actions) of the experimenter
agent are not pre-determined by the past history of the universe. In particular, the variables
associated with the choices by the epistemic agent must not be pre-determined, although
they will be unpredictably determined, by “the hidden variables v in the overlap of the back-
ward light cones. . . ” (Bell [3]). For the technical meaning of the notion of “unpredictably
determined” variables, in terms of ‘universally uncomputable’ variables, consult Sect. 4.
2.2. John Bell’s concept of “free variables” contradicts “super-determinism”
That Bell was well aware of the crucial distinction between, on the one hand, “pre-
determinism”, such as in the form of “super -determinism”, and, on the other hand, standard
“determinism”, is clearly evident from his final statements on the free will problem (Bell [10]).
“One can envisage theories”, Bell noted, “in which there just are no free variables. . . In such
‘super-deterministic’ theories the apparent free will of experimenters, and any other apparent
randomness, would be illusory.” Here, Bell notes that in theories with unfree variables, which
he calls “super-deterministic theories”, experimenter free will is absent. Unfree variables
are those whose values are fully pre-determined, e.g., predictably determined, by the past
information in the universe. The fact that Bell was a compatibilist and that he argued for
the possibility of effective experimenter free will in relation to a deterministic world view,
is apparent from his clear rejection of the super-deterministic approach. “I do not expect
to see a serious theory of this kind”, Bell [10] explained further. Instead, he proposed that
“I would expect a serious theory to permit ‘deterministic chaos’ or ‘pseudorandomness’, for
complicated subsystems (e.g., computers) which would provide variables sufficiently free for
the purpose at hand.”
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2.3. John Bell’s concept of “free variables” implies emergent unpredictability
The chief characteristic of “deterministic chaos”, i.e., of the strictly nonlinear, emergent
phenomenon that is accounted for by self-organization or complexity theory, is the uncer-
tainty, or unpredictability, of observable outcomes. This is despite the fact that the chaotic
behavior is entirely governed by deterministic relations. In principle, this essential feature of
deterministic chaos, holds true for physical, chemical, biological, and even psycho-physical,
systems, including in neurophysiological brain states potentially associated with the free-
choice performance by an experimenter agent (for an overview, e.g., Walleczek [11]). In
short, the image used by Bell of “deterministic chaos” represents well the notion of “ef-
fective indeterminism” or “determinism without predeterminism”. At the same time, Bell’s
reference to deterministic chaos and pseudorandomness is, of course, wholly incompatible
with the intrinsic randomness assumption of orthodox quantum mechanics shown in Fig. 1.1.
Consequently, it is misleading to characterize John Bell’s own, well-documented views on free
will (Bell [3]) as being consistent with – metaphysically and physically – the incompatibilist
free-choice concept described by Colbeck and Renner [8].
Finally, while the “super-indeterminism” in orthodox quantum mechanics has been con-
sidered before, although not as a general metaphysical position (e.g., Hossenfelder [12]), it
was nevertheless argued by many others that a compatibilist free will concept, i.e., determ-
inism, must be in violation of the non-signalling constraint (e.g., Barrett et al. [13]; Kofler
et al. [14]). The non-signalling constraint mediates the apparent conflict between quantum
theory and the theory of special relativity (e.g., Eberhard [15]), and its role in deciding the
viability of compatibilist free-will concepts in quantum mechanics is reviewed next.
3. THE NON-SIGNALLING THEOREM IN THE DECISION WHETHER ONLY
AN INCOMPATIBILIST FREE WILL CONCEPT IS VIABLE FOR QUANTUM
MECHANICS
A standard view holds that only quantum theories invoking universal or fundamental
indeterminism could successfully reproduce the predictions that are yielded by orthodox
quantum mechanics. Specifically when negating the involvement of “cosmic conspiracy”
theories, such as super-determinism (e.g., Bell [10]), in the interpretation of measurement
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outcomes, this view is widely thought to hold true. One major reason is the suggested
violation of the standard, i.e., axiomatic, non-signalling constraint in any possible ontological
quantum theory (e.g., Colbeck and Renner [16, 17]; Gallego et al. [18]). Axiomatic non-
signalling, which was presumed in Bell’s original interpretation of his theorem (Bell [19]),
is often considered mandatory, therefore, from the mainstream perspective (see Fig. 3.1).
However, as was argued recently, and is illustrated in Fig. 3.1, the case for, or against,
an axiomatic non-signalling assumption is undecidable on logical grounds alone (Walleczek
and Gro¨ssing [20, 21]). The reason is the non-reducible, relational interdependence of the
metaphysical assumptions that underlie such considerations (see legend to Fig. 3.1).
Figure 3.1. An axiomatic non-signalling assumption does not represent a conclusive argument for or
against determinism and nonlocal hidden-variables theories in quantum mechanics (from Walleczek
and Gro¨ssing [21]). As illustrated in Fig. 1.1 also, there exists – in orthodox quantum mechanics –
an interdependence of free-choice (A) and intrinsic randomness (B) assumptions. The validity of an
axiomatic non-signalling assumption (C), a standard assumption in orthodox quantum mechanics,
depends in turn on the independent validity of assumptions A and B. Importantly, the concept of
super-indeterminism (Fig. 1.1) demonstrates that an independent validation is out of reach however.
This implies that the validity of the axiomatic interpretation of the non-signalling theorem cannot
be proven based on present knowledge (for more details see Walleczek and Gro¨ssing [21]).
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3.1. The two interpretations by John Bell of the non-signalling theorem
As was reviewed recently, John Bell shifted his interest – after 1976 – from an “axiomatic
non-signalling” assumption (Figs. 3.1 and 3.2) towards an assumption of “effective non-
signalling” (Fig. 3.2), which is the non-signalling assumption that is compatible with de
Broglie–Bohm theory (Walleczek and Gro¨ssing [21]). In the context of the present analysis,
an effective non-signalling theorem only, but not an axiomatic one, is compatible also with
Bell’s notion of “free variables” as described in Sect. 2. That is, an effective non-signalling
theorem allows for nonlocal quantum information transfers while – at the same time – it
prohibits superluminal signalling and communication. Fig. 3.2 provides a summary (i) of
the two contrasting interpretations by John Bell of the non-signalling theorem and (ii) of the
communication-theoretic criterion which was shown to account for the difference between
Bell’s original position of 1964 (Bell [19]) and his later position which he first introduced in
Figure 3.2. The two different interpretations by John Bell of the non-signalling theorem (from
Walleczek and Gro¨ssing [21]). Bell’s first interpretation (Bell [19]), here called “axiomatic non-
signalling”, rejects any form of deterministic quantum mechanics, upon assuming experimenter
freedom in the incompatibilist, super-indeterministic sense (Fig. 1.1). The second, subsequent
interpretation (Bell [9]), here called “effective non-signalling”, is compatible with ontological, de-
terministic quantum approaches, including of the nonlocal type. Importantly, unlike axiomatic
non-signalling, an effective non-signalling theorem does not prohibit the nonlocal transfer of un-
controllable, i.e., non-Shannon, signals. For definitions of Shannon and non-Shannon signals in
the context of Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication see Walleczek and Gro¨ssing [21].
Effective non-signalling ensures the possibility of de Broglie–Bohm theory, under an effective free
choice assumption, in agreement with Bell’s compatibilist notion of “free variables” (Bell [3]).
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1976 (Bell [9]).
For the current analysis of the free will concept, the critical reason for introducing an
effective, instead of an axiomatic, non-signalling condition is the following: an effective non-
signalling concept eliminates the danger of contradiction between the free choice assumption
and the non-signalling principle, for example, in the context of de Broglie–Bohm theory
(Walleczek and Gro¨ssing [21]). Next, given the different options for interpreting the notion
of experimenter freedom – compatibilism versus incompatibilism, Sect. 4 will offer an outlook
towards the possible future of the free will concept in quantum mechanics and beyond.
4. THE FUTURE OF FREE WILL IN QUANTUM MECHANICS AND BEYOND:
HOW IS FREEDOM POSSIBLE?
What is meant by the reality of experimenter free will? This work defined the reality
of freedom – until now – simply as the negation of the statement that free will is an illu-
sion. This preliminary (circular) definition drew on the earlier statement by John Bell [10]
who had explained that in “. . . ‘super-deterministic theories’ the apparent free will of ex-
perimenters, and any other apparent randomness, would be illusory.” Thus, Bell’s concept
of super-determinism, as in “super-pre-determinism”, implicates the complete absence of
experimenter free will (see Sect. 2.2). However, for those theories that do not implicate
super-determinism, how could experimenter free will be possible?
An informal, intuitive understanding of free will assumes that the free-willed agent is
“free to choose” among different options or alternatives. Also known as the principle of
alternative possibilities (e.g., Kane [5]), the intuitive understanding instantly raises the
problem of “control” in free-willed choices: Who or what is in charge when is performed the
“intentional” selection of one option from a set of many alternative options? The concept
of ‘experimenter freedom’ cannot, therefore, be reasonably discussed without considering
also the concept of ‘experimenter control ’. Indeed, generations of free-will philosophers have
pointed out the close connection between freedom and control (for reviews see Kane [5]). For
example, free will would be an illusion if an experimenter agent lacks (operational) control
over his or her performance, such as in setting up a certain experimental configuration for
the purpose of “asking specific questions of nature”. An agent who can serve as a “source of
operational control” was previously defined as a type-1 agent, whereas a “source of random
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variables” – without the element of control – was characterized as a type-2 source. For
explanation, a ‘random event generator ’ represents a type-2 source, but it does not possess
type-1 agency, according to these definitions (Walleczek and Gro¨ssing [21]).
4.1. Quo Vadis quantum mechanics? Dualism or monism?
Again, since “randomness” is usually viewed as the opposite of “control” it is hard to
comprehend how ‘universal indeterminism’ – by itself – could provide a realistic basis for
the free-willed actions of (type-1) agents. Similarly, “non-randomness”, in the form of
(pre)determinism, is equally unable to provide for the capacity of controlling physical events
by an agent’s own free will. Consensus appears to be building towards the view that neither
determinism nor indeterminism provides an obvious pathway towards freedom and control
(e.g., Kane [4, 5]). Regarding the free-willed control by an agent of physical events in
nature, only an “extra-physical factor” might advance the possibility of genuine freedom
in the strong sense of manifesting agent control. It certainly appears to be impossible to
conceive of a scenario in which this extra-physical “causal power” (e.g., a concept of “free
mental causation” by an agent) would not be in violation of the central tenet of modern
science: the rejection of dualism in the form of the Cartesian separation of agent “mind”
from “matter” (e.g., compare Cartesian ‘Res Cogitans’ versus ‘Res Extensae’). Quo Vadis
quantum mechanics? Un-physical dualism or physical monism? The final Fig. 4.1 illustrates
a comparison of the two competing metaphysical frameworks that underlie the available
options – universal indeterminism and determinism. What do these options mean for the
future of quantum mechanics, e.g., regarding the pressing issue of operationalism versus
realism in quantum theory?
Modern science rejects the Cartesian split, i.e., metaphysical dualism, between agents
and world. Instead, modern science posits that experimenter agents are integral elements
(of reality) of the physical universe, i.e., agents and universe – together – constitute a
relational physical continuum. This non-dual continuum principle is indicated by the open
line in Fig. 4.1 which encloses the (operational) presence of the experimenter agent as an
intrinsic element of the universe. Importantly, natural science posits that the behavior of
both experimenter agent and the rest of the physical universe is constrained by the same
Laws of Nature, e.g., quantum theory and relativity theory. This reflects the (monistic)
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Figure 4.1. Illustrating (A) universal indeterminism and (B) universal determinism. (A) In ‘uni-
versal indeterminism’, agents and the physical universe are subject to the same fundamental inde-
terminism. Here, the in-principle unpredictability of physical observables is a function of “intrinsic
randomness”. Note that – by itself – indeterminism neither rejects nor affirms the reality of
“free will” or “free choice” as a result of super -indeterminism (see Fig. 1.1). (B) In ‘universal
determinism’, agents and the physical universe are subject to the same fundamental determinism.
Here, the in-principle unpredictability of physical observables is a function of “intrinsic complex-
ity”. Note that determinism need not be identified with super-determinism in the form of super-
predeterminism (see Sect. 2.2). This unnecessary, even false, identification of determinism with
pre-determinism would render any notions of “free will” or “free choice” obsolete as part of scenario
(B).
position of scientific physicalism. Must the physicalist position be radically revised in light
of orthodox quantum mechanics and of the concept of super-indeterminism in Fig. 1.1?
4.2. Sources of unpredictability in universal indeterminism and determinism
The above analysis suggests that the relationship between experimenter freedom and
experimenter control is neither addressed by universal indeterminism (Fig. 4.1a) nor by
universal determinism (Fig. 4.1b). To repeat, the notion of ‘control’ is usually identified with
determination, whereas the notion of ‘freedom’ with indetermination. In any case, essential
to any minimal conception of experimenter freedom, as defined in the beginning of Sect. 4,
appears to be the in-principle unpredictability of individual events in the universe. Naturally,
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this must include also an agent’s free-choice performance in the selection of measurement
settings as an entirely unpredictable event itself (compare Fig. 4.1). On the one hand,
orthodox quantum mechanics offers the traditional metaphysical position in regards to the
source of in-principle unpredictability: “intrinsic randomness” (Fig. 4.1a). On the other
hand, concepts such as Bell’s notion of “free variables”, for example, offer an alternative
metaphysical position: “intrinsic complexity”. This alternative position is consistent with a
universally deterministic universe (see Fig. 4.1b). Finally, Bell’s free-variables concept will
be briefly discussed against the background of self-organization, complexity, or emergence,
theory which advances the notion of observables in nature that are universally uncomputable.
4.3. John Bell’s “free variables” as universally uncomputable variables
Free variables are those that are “. . . effectively free for the purposes at hand” (Bell [3]).
As was reviewed in Sect. 2, in reference to “free variables”, John Bell raised the similarity to
phenomena from nonlinear dynamics such as ‘deterministic chaos’, e.g., ‘pseudorandomness’.
The present work suggests that Bell’s concept of free variables can be justifiably defined as
variables that emerge as a function of the intrinsic complexity of universally deterministic
processes (compare Fig. 4.1b). These complex and self-referential processes may generate
physical observables whose values are universally uncomputable, i.e., their computation
would require an infinite amount of computational resources. In this scenario, even Laplace’s
demon, and “the universe itself ”, would be incapable of predicting with absolute certainty
the future outcome of individual microscopic events in nature. The concept of universal
uncomputability, which is inherent in self-referential systems dynamics, plausibly offers the
kind of effective unpredictability which John Bell sought. For example, see also the notions
of “effective indeterminism” and “determination without predetermination” in Sect. 2.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The here introduced concept of super-indeterminism for orthodox quantum mechanics,
which was shown to underlie the free will theorem by Conway and Kochen [1, 2], is con-
sistent only with the metaphysical position shown in Fig. 4.1a: intrinsic randomness. By
contrast, John Bell’s search for an effective free will concept was shown to be consistent
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only with the position shown in Fig. 4.1b: intrinsic complexity. It is likely that signific-
ant advances towards a realist quantum mechanics will depend on new insights into what
might be called also “quantum complexity”, i.e., complexity at the smallest dimensions of
reality. Summarizing, this work has identified two distinct routes towards avoiding the “cos-
mic pre-determination” of the free-choice performance by an experimenter agent: intrinsic
randomness and intrinsic complexity (Fig. 4.1). Importantly, neither route was found to
address the problem of the “free-willed control” – by an agent – of any physical events in
nature. Importantly, both routes were argued to satisfy the minimal requirement of unpre-
dictability, i.e., lack of pre-determination, of an agent’s choices based upon past information
about the universe. Finally, a better understanding of the limits and possibilities of the
alternative position of quantum complexity – as a source of unpredictability – will require
the development of a deeper understanding of the relationship between quantum theory and
the theory of complexity, self-organization, and emergence. The prospects for the possibility
of an emergent quantum mechanics critically depends on fashioning a deeper understanding
also – in agreement with Bell’s effective free will concept – of the relational nature of an
emergent universe, including of emergent space and time.
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